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Privacy by Deletion: The Need for a Global Data 
Deletion Principle 
BENJAMIN J. KEELE* 
ABSTRACT 
With global personal information flows increasing, efforts have been made to de-
velop principles to standardize data protection regulations. However, no set of princi-
ples has yet achieved universal adoption. This note proposes a principle mandating that 
personal data be securely destroyed when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for 
which it was collected. Including a data deletion principle in future data protection 
standards will increase respect for individual autonomy and decrease the risk of abuse 
of personal data. Though data deletion is already practiced by many data controllers, 
including it in legal data protection mandates will further the goal of establishing an 
effective global data protection regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the rise of digital storage and information searching technologies, peo-
ple's lives have become increasingly documented.1 Financial transactions, visits to 
the doctor, job applications, and even web searches produce information that can 
be used to identify a particular individual and serve as a record of his or her pri-
vate activities. If one could keep track of and control all of one's data, perhaps this 
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ubiquitous record-keeping would cause little concern. But data does not stay in 
one place, or even one country. Instead, per~onal information is frequently trans-
ferred across national borders. 2 Multinationak corporations transfer data between 
offices in different nations; organizations outsource data processing to entities in 
other countries; and citizens of different nations complete transactions with each 
other, transferring personal data in the process. 
This increased data flow creates uncertainty about which data protection 
laws apply to personal information. Nations protect their citizens' information 
privacy in different ways, and entities that collect, process, or store personal infor-
mation (data controllers) have the difficult task of determining how to comply 
with applicable laws. If the data controllers have trouble knowing what they may 
do with a given set of data in a given jurisdiction, how can the individuals whose 
information is in the data set-the data subjects-know what can be done with 
their personal information? 
There are many benefits to global transfers of personal data,3 but confusion 
and disagreement over treatment of personal information in different jurisdic-
tions can prevent, and have prevented, these benefits from being fully realized. 
For example, European law has been an obstacle to some transfers of data, such as 
airline passenger data, to the United States.4 The United States government was 
interested in transfers of airline passenger data for national security reasons. 
While an interim agreement was eventually reached that enabled the United 
States to receive the information and a final accord is near,5 for a time, air travel 
between the United States and Europe was threatened by disagreement over how 
European travelers' Passenger Name Records (PNR) would be transferred, pro-
cessed, and stored. Also, the European Union has taken steps against data con-
trollers who retain data for too long; the situation of America-based search engine 
Google illustrates the difficulties divergent data protection laws can cause.6 In 
sum, inconsistent data protection laws have impeded beneficial global transfers of 
2. Miriam Wugmeister eta!., Global Solution for Cross-Border Data Transfrrs: Making the Case 
for Corporate Privacy Rules, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 449, 449 (2007). 
3. /d. 
4. Ellen Nakashima, U.S., E.U. Miss Deadline on Data-Sharing Agreement, WASH. PosT, Oct. I, 
2006, at Al4. For background on the PNR disagreement, see generally Irfan Tukdi, Comment, 
Transatlantic Turbulence: The Passenger Name Record Conflict, 45 Hous. L. REV. 587 (2008). 
5. Charlie Savage, U.S. and Europe Near Agreement on Private Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, 
at AI. 
6. Google was warned for keeping search logs for two years. See Kevin J. O'Brien & Thomas 
Crampton, European Union Warns Coogle on Possible Violations of Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2007, at C3. 
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personal information and have slowed important interactions between govern-
ments, companies, and individuals on a global scale/ 
A promising solution to this quandary is global data protection principles-
standards developed by international bodies that serve as models for drafting and 
harmonizing nations' data protection laws. If a set of data protection principles 
achieved widespread acceptance, then governments, multinational corporations, 
and other global actors would have consistent data protection standards that 
would greatly ameliorate the difficulties caused by the current patchwork of data 
protection regulations. 
Unfortunately, no set of principles has yet reached this tipping point to become a 
universally adopted, global standard. The Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development's Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of Personal Data8 have influenced many later data protection laws.9 The European 
Union's Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data10 (hereinafter EU 
Directive) has been the foundation of data protection law within the European 
Union. Despite the importance of these standards, however, no global consensus on 
data protection has been reached. Furthermore, the existing standards are vague and 
thus unlikely to produce uniform results even if widely adopted. Even the most spe-
cific set of principles, the EU Directive, permits wide variation in national data pro-
tection laws.U Most other candidates for global data protection standards, like the 
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework, are voluntary and anticipate di-
vergent implementation by national governmentsY 
This note offers a proposal for a data deletion principle to be included in fu-
ture sets of privacy standards. The data deletion principle will require data con-
7. Wugmeister,supra note 2, at 449-50. For other examples, see FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 126-27 (1997). 
8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Pri-
vacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OEC Doc. 93200201HES (Oct. I, 1980), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_l,OO.htrnl [hereinafter 
OECD]. 
9. Fred H. Care, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CoNSUMER PROTECTION 
IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION EcONOMY' 348 (Janet K. Winn ed., 2006). 
10. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (EU), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexU riServ/Lex UriServ.do ?uri= CELEX:3199SL0046: EN: HTM L 
[hereinafter EU Directive]. 
II. Andrew Charlesworth, Information Privacy Law in the European Union: E Pluribus Unum or 
Ex Uno Plures?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 931,939 (2003). 
12. Carla Bulord, Note, Between East and West: The APEC Privacy Framework and the Balance of 
International Data Flows, 3 liS: J. L. & PoL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'y 705, 711 (2008). 
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trollers, overseen by legally authorized public or private sector data protection 
agencies, to establish record destruction schedules that will apply consistently 
across national boundaries and industries. Failure to comply with one's own data 
destruction schedule could result in fines or liability to any individual harmed by 
data that were not properly destroyed. 
While the idea of a data deletion principle is not entirely novel, the interna-
tional consensus that has coalesced around other data protection principles has 
not yet encompassed a deletion principle. This note argues for a strong but flexible 
data deletion principle, and fleshes out the various policy considerations affected 
by a legal mandate to destroy personal information. Global data protection stan-
dards should cover the entire life cycle of information, up to and including the 
necessary destruction of personal information. Until a data deletion principle is 
adopted as an integral part of a data protection regime that protects privacy while 
permitting global data transfers, no data protection scheme will be complete. 
Part I will review past sets of data protection principles and demonstrate that 
data deletion has not been given sufficient attention and treatment. Part II will 
argue that the omission of a data deletion principle is a fundamental weakness in 
any global data protection regime. Part III will set out a proposed data deletion 
principle and examine the advantages of and obstacles to its adoption. 
I. THE MISSING DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE 
With the advent of digital information storage and processing, personal in-
formation can be more easily collected, stored, transferred, and processed. 13 This 
raises important privacy concerns. Data protection principles have been developed 
at the national and regional levels to allow for the use of personal data in benefi-
cial ways while reducing the risk of abuse. A data deletion principle would help 
achieve these goals, but unlike many data protection principles, data deletion has 
not yet been generally accepted. 
A. Data Protection: Helping to Preserve Individual Autonomy in a Bureaucratic 
World and Prevent Harmful Uses of Personal Information 
Privacy and data protection implicate numerous social values and civil rights, 
including autonomy over one's body, freedom from unjustified searches, control 
13. SOLOVE,supra note I, at 3-4. 
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over one's public persona, and privacy in one's personal thoughts. 14 Data protec-
tion principles seek to address one particular aspect of privacy: maintaining ap-
propriate control over non-public data that relate to and identify a particular 
individual. Examples of such personal information include records of financial 
transactions, medical conditions, private online activities, and academic and em-
ployment histories. An appropriate balance must be struck between permitting 
economically beneficial and socially essential uses of personal data while prevent-
ing harm to data subjects and giving data subjects sufficient control to maintain a 
minimum degree of autonomy.15 
Data protection principles generally regulate the collection, storage, transfer, 
and processing of personal data. These are important functions because as indi-
viduals' lives become more susceptible to recording and analysis, entities and insti-
tutions are more likely to use personal data to make important decisions. Personal 
data can also be used by entities, institutions, and third parties capable of directly 
or indirectly accessing the information in ways that may harm individuals identi-
fied by the data. 
Many important decisions about individuals are based upon their personal 
information. Most applications for credit cards, car loans, or mortgages are 
screened on the basis of personal information contained in credit bureau reports. 
Many employers run criminal background checks on prospective employees. In-
surers check personal data before issuing insurance policies. It is clear that many 
essential tasks, ranging from obtaining a checking account to purchasing medi-
cine containing pseudoephedrine, require the collection, storage, and analysis of 
individuals' personal information. 
Much of this personal information is processed in bureaucratic organizations, 
entities that are characterized by a "hierarchical chain-of-command, specialized 
offices to carry out particular functions, and a system of general rules to manage 
the organization."16 Professor Solove notes that bureaucracies, while generally ef-
ficient and impartial, ignore the unusual needs of particular individuals; avoid 
accountability by obscuring decision-making processes; and fail to control abuses 
of functionaries' discretion.17 
14. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2001). 
15. See CATE,supra note 7, at 31. 
16. SoLOVE,supra note I, at 38. 
17. /d. at 39. 
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Bureaucratic decision-making processes are being exercised ever 
more frequently over a greater sphere of our lives, and we have little 
power or say within such a system, which tends to structure our 
participation along standardized ways that fail to enable us to 
achieve our goals, wants, and needs. 18 · 
Thus, while bureaucratic processing of personal data is necessary and even 
beneficial, it must be regulated to give individuals some measure of control over 
their personal information, thereby forcing data controllers to respect the indi-
viduals' autonomy and allowing the individual to participate in these important 
decision-making processes. Data protection principles (and, through modeling 
and harmonization, national data protection laws) can regulate data controllers to 
protect individual dignity and autonomy in the use of personal information. 
Aside from allowing sufficient individual control in personal data processing, 
data protection principles also help reduce the risk of abuses of personal data. 
There are myriad ways in which personal information may be used to the severe 
detriment of data subjects, ranging from the financially crippling (fraud, identity 
theft, or insurance discrimination) to the relatively innocuous but irritating (un-
wanted telephone or mail solicitations).19 In addition to causing the loss of indi-
viduals' money, time, patience, or reputation, abuse of personal information also 
reduces individuals' confidence in the systems that utilize personal data, thus lim-
iting the potential social benefits of such systems. For example, widespread adop-
tion of electronic health records, an innovation that could reduce health care costs 
and facilitate valuable medical research, has been slowed, in part, by disagree-
ments over rules balancing patient privacy against beneficial uses of data. 20 Data 
protection principles that help reduce the risk of these harms will protect data 
subjects' interests and increase confidence in legitimate and useful personal infor-
mation systems. These perceived benefits have prompted several attempts to de-
velop global data protection standards. 
18./d. 
19. CATE,supra note 14, at 6-7. 
20. Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, Health Hazard: Computers Spilling Your History, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, at 31. 
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B. Current Global Data Protection Standards: Failing to Consistently Regulate Data 
Deletion 
Beginning m the 1970s with the United States' Fair Information Practice 
Principles,21 governments have attempted to develop standards capable of serving as 
conceptual foundations for data protection policies. While some sets of international 
privacy principles have mentioned destruction of data as part of particular principles, 
data deletion has never been deemed to merit its own complete data protection prin-
ciple. The following review of established data protection standards will illustrate 
accepted data protection norms and the absence of data deletion in those standards. 
1. OECD Guidelines 
The first global privacy standards were proposed by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1980. The OECD Guidelines 
were heavily influenced by earlier United States government work on fair informa-
tion practicesY While not universal, the OECD Guidelines are the most widely ac-
cepted data protection standards. Thus, the OECD Guidelines represent baseline 
data protection standards and have served as the foundation for later principles. 23 
The OECD Guidelines contain eight principles, most of which have appeared 
in later sets of standards with minor variations and under slightly different names.24 
The Collection Limitation Principle25 limits how personal data are collected. The 
data must be collected by lawful and fair means, and generally, data subjects should 
know about the data collection and provide consent. The Data Quality Principle26 
deals with how the data are maintained. Data should be kept accurate and current 
to the extent the purpose of the data set requires. The Purpose Specification Prin-
ciple27 mandates that the purpose for the data collection be stated no later than at the 
time of collection. The data cannot later be used for a purpose "incompatible" with 
the original collection purpose. What is "incompatible" is not entirely clear, but the 
21. See SEc'y ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. 
& WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973). 
22. Cate,supra note 9, at 348. 
23. Professor Cate notes that "most of the dozens of national and regional privacy regimes ad-
opted after 1980 claim to reflect the OECD Guidelines." !d. 
24. While the precise details of all data protection principles are not relevant to this Note, see 
generally id., for a concise but detailed history of data protection principles. 
25. OECD, supra note 8, 1J 7. 
26. ld.1J 8. 
27. ld.1J 9. 
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Purpose Specification Principle does reduce to some extent "function creep" (data 
being collected for one purpose and then used for a different purpose later). For 
example, under this principle, information collected for assessing taxes could not 
later be used for issuing drivers' licenses. The Use Limitation Principle28 supports 
the Purpose Specification Principle by demanding that data not be disclosed or used 
for purposes other than the ones specified. Exceptions are made with the data sub-
ject's consent or when authorized by law. 
The Security Safeguards Principle29 requires reasonable precautions against 
loss, unauthorized access, modification, disclosure, or destruction of data. The 
Openness Principle30 states that individuals should be able to easily determine if a 
data controller has data about them and how that data may be accessed. Flowing 
from the Openness Principle is the Individual Participation Principle,31 which 
provides that procedures should exist by which data subjects may access their data. 
If the data are inaccurate, the data subject should be able to challenge the data and 
have them corrected or deleted. This is the only mention of data deletion in the 
OECD Guidelines. Finally, the Accountability Principle32 simply states that data 
controllers should be held accountable for complying with the other principles. 
While collection, use, disclosure, and storage of personal data are included, the 
Guidelines lack a principle regarding the destruction of data, the last stage of the 
data life cycle. Only when data are incorrect does a data subject's privacy interest 
require deletion (if modification of such data does not correct the inaccuracy). Per-
haps because the OECD Guidelines, the first and most widely accepted set of data 
protection principles, did not substantively deal with the issue of data deletion, later 
actors did not feel compelled to regulate the last stage of the data life cycle. 
2. Council of Europe Convention 
A year after the OECD Guidelines were adopted, the Council of Europe pro-
mulgated the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Col-
lection and Processing of Personal Data on Information Highways (COE 
Convention).33 The COE Convention contains principles similar to the OECD 
28./d. ~ 10. 
29. /d. ~ 11. 
30. OECD,supra note 8, ~ 12. 
31. /d. ~ 13. 
32./d. ~ 14. 
33. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981,20 I.L.M. 3!7,avai/ableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
en/Treaties/Html/108.htm [hereinafter COE Convention]. 
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Guidelines' Collection Limitation, Use Limitation, Purpose Specification, Data 
Quality, Security Safeguards, and Individual Participation Principles.34 An interest-
ing difference in the COE Convention's Data Quality Principle is a requirement that 
once the need for identifying specific individuals has passed, the data should be ano-
nymized to avoid identifying specific individuals.35 Thus, while the COE Convention 
does not require complete destruction of any data, it does require deletion of data that 
can identify a specific person when the specified purpose of the data set no longer 
requires identification of individuals. The requirement that data be deleted if inac-
curate and challenged by the data subject also appears in the COE Convention.36 Al-
though the COE Convention furthered the notion of data deletion in its data 
protection standards, it ultimately fell short of creating a data deletion standard. 
3. EU Directive 
In 1995, the European Union (EU) adopted the Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement 
of Such Data (EU Directive).37 The EU Directive, similar to its data protection pre-
decessors, contains principles on collection limitation, purpose specification, data 
quality, security, openness, and individual access. Like the COE Convention, the 
Data Quality Principle of the EU Directive requires anonymization of data when the 
data's purpose has been served.38 Additional innovations include a requirement that 
the amount of data collected not be excessive relative to the collection's specified pur-
pose.39 New principles were also enacted to restrict transfers of data only to recipients 
who provide an "adequate level of protection" for the data,40 to specially protect "sen-
sitive" data (data on racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, philo-
sophical or ethical persuasion, and health and sexuallife),41 and to give individuals 
the right to know the logic of any processes that use their data to make automated 
decisions.42 Enforcement principles were also added: one for independent oversight of 
34. /d. arts. 5, 7, 8. 
35. /d. art. 5(e). 
36. /d. art. 8(c). 
37. EU Directive, supra note 10. 
38. /d. art. 6(e). 
39. /d. art. 6(c). 
40. /d. art. 25. 
41. /d. art. 8. 
42. /d. art. 12. An example of an automated decision is an automated process that analyzes certain 
financial facts about an individual and thereby determines whether to grant the individual a loan. 
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data controllers by government agencies, and one giving individuals enforceable 
rights against data controllers who violate national data protection laws.43 
The EU Directive has been called "the high-water mark of substantive legal 
protection for information privacy"44 and, due to its transborder transfer restric-
tions, "the closest approximation to a strong global data protection standard in 
operation."45 However, the EU Directive suffers from a major omission: a princi-
ple of data deletion. National data protection laws could regulate data deletion, 
but to comply with the EU Directive, national laws need only require anonymiza-
tion when the purpose for collecting the personal information no longer requires 
identification and deletion when data are challenged and found to be incorrect. 
A notable feature of the COE Convention and EU Directive is that they im-
pose legal duties on the signatory national governments to harmonize their data 
protection laws with the principles.46 Supranational authorities can, to some ex-
tent, enforce the harmonization of national laws, facilitating data transfers be-
tween signatory countries. The flip side of this coin is that non-signatory nations 
are barred from receiving data transfers unless they are deemed to have sufficient 
data protection safeguards.47 This has necessitated the Safe Harbor Agreement 
between the EU and the U.S. Department of Commerce to enable transatlantic 
data transfers.48 Any future global data protection standard will have to either 
supplant the European standards or meet their minimum requirements. 
4. APEC Privacy Framework 
In 2004, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) sought to mod-
ernize the OECD Guidelines. The final result was the adoption of the APEC 
Privacy Framework (Framework).49 The Purpose Specification Principle disap-
peared in this iteration, and new principles were added. The Framework now 
43. /d. arts. 22-24. 
44. Cate,supra note 9, at 351. 
45. Sunni Yuen, Exporting Data with Trust: Audited Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border 
Data Tramfer Protection Concerm in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. 
REv. 41, 69 (2008), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=9&article=2. 
46. COE Convention, supra note 33, art. 4; EU Directive, supra note 10, art. I. 
47. CATE,supra note 7, at 126. 
48. For a summary of the Safe Harbor Agreement, see A.B.A. SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
OGY LAW, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 94-97 (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004). 
49. Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, Nov. 20, 2004, available 
at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA26458 
24B)-APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdfl$file/APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf [hereinafter 
APEC Framework]. 
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contains the Preventing Harm Principle/0 which focuses on reducing the risk of 
harmful misuses of personal data. Data controllers should have specific obliga-
tions to avoid harm and safeguards should be proportional to the risk of harm. 
The Notice Principle51 is similar to the Purpose Specification Principle in that 
data subjects should be notified of the general privacy policies relating to the data 
collection. The Collection Limitation Principle52 and Uses of Personal Informa-
tion Principle53 require that data should be collected and used only in accordance 
with the purposes of the data collection. However, rather than using the "incom-
patible" criterion found in the OECD Guidelines, there are three exceptions for 
using data for other purposes: when consent of the data subject is obtained; to 
provide a service requested by the data subject; and by authority oflaw.54 
The Framework further emphasizes procedural rights. The Choice Principle55 
directs data controllers to give individuals more choices regarding the collection, use, 
and disclosure of data relating to the individuals. The Integrity of Personal Informa-
tion Principle,56 Security Safeguards Principle,57 Access and Correction Principle/8 
and Accountability Principle59 are all similar to earlier principles. Despite the Frame-
work's significant changes and additions to data protection standards, data deletion is 
mentioned only in the context of deleting inaccurate data that have been challenged 
by the data subject.60 The Framework has been endorsed as the most promising set of 
data protection standards by several major global actors, including Google.61 
5. Global Privacy Standard 
The most recent set of proposed data protection principles is the Global Privacy 
Standard (GPS).62 Adopted in 2006 by the International Data Protection Commis-
sioners Conference, the GPS is unlike earlier sets of data protection principles that 
50. /d.~ 14. 
51. /d.~ 15. 
52. /d.~ 18. 
53. /d.~ 19. 
54. /d.~ 19. 
55. /d.~ 20. 
56. /d.~ 21. 
57. /d.~ 22. 
58. /d.~ 23. 
59. /d.~ 26. 
60. /d.~ 23. 
61. Peter Fleischer, Call for Global Privacy Standards, Google Public Policy Blog, http:l/googlepu-
blicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/09/call-for-global-privacy-standards.html (Sept. 14, 2007, II :03 PST). 
62. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, CREATION OF A GLOBAL PRI-
VACY STANDARD I (2006), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-gps.pdf [hereinafter GPS]. 
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focused on economic regions. It was explicitly designed to be a definitive, global 
standard. The data protection commissioners sought to take account of the "strengths 
and weaknesses of the major codes in existence" and "harmon[ize] the principles 
into a single set of fair information principles."63 Most of the principles (accountabil-
ity, collection limitation, purpose, accuracy, security, openness, access, and compli-
ance) are similar to their predecessors. However, three major changes appear. 
The Consent Principle64 explicitly deals with requiring data subject consent for 
the collection, use, and disclosure of data. Although consent was previously men-
tioned in other principles, it is now given greater significance with its own principle. 
Under the principle, the more sensitive the information being collected, the more 
specific the data subject's consent must be.65 The Collection Limitation Principle66 
contains a data minimalization requirement, which holds that if possible, non-iden-
tifying information should be used. If identifying data must be used, then the mini-
mal amount of data required to fulfill the purpose should be collected. 
Finally, the Use, Retention, and Disclosure Limitation Principle contains the fol-
lowing provision: "Personal information shall be retained only as necessary to fulfill 
the stated purposes, and then securely destroyed.''67 This is the first general mandate 
to securely destroy personal information that is no longer needed by data controllers. 
While it is an important step toward completing data protection regulations, the pro-
vision provides a vague criterion for determining when data should be destroyed-
when keeping the data is not necessary to fulfill the stated purposes of the data 
collection. While granting discretion to data controllers has benefits, transparency in 
the collection and processing of personal data and accountability of data controllers, 
as articulated in other principles, requires some limits on that discretion. 
Data deletion has been mentioned in some sets of principles- at least obliquely, 
in the anonymization provisions. It is time for data deletion to become more fully 
developed as a complete data protection principle, like consent and choice principles, 
in the Framework and GPS. While procedural protections like consent and choice 
are important, substantive safeguards are needed to provide a floor of protection. 
Until the substantive protection accorded by destruction of personal data is recog-
nized as an important part of reducing harm and respecting individual autonomy, 
63./d. 
64. /d. at3. 
65./d. 
66./d. 
67./d. 
PRIVACY BY DELETION 375 
data protection principles will not be able to reach their full potential or serve as a 
solid foundation for a comprehensive, effective, global data protection regime. 
II. THE NEED FOR A DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE 
When there is a need for personal data, those data are collected, processed, 
transferred, and stored. Take the development of the credit reporting system. Lend-
ers wanted a way to separate reliable borrowers from risky ones. By collecting the 
borrowing histories of potential clients, lenders could decide to whom to lend and at 
what interest rate. Credit reporting agencies collect information from creditors and 
process it (aggregating it into useful reports and producing credit scores), disclose it 
(sending credit reports about loan applicants to lenders), and store it for later use. 
But what should happen to these data holdings when they no longer fulfill the 
purpose for which they were collected? For example, borrowers eventually die, and 
their lending histories can no longer help decide if more loans should be granted. 
Additionally, the failure to make a payment twenty years ago may no longer accu-
rately reflect a borrower's current reliability. The consequences of maintaining per-
sonal information beyond its useful life are severe enough that they merit adequate 
preventative measures that only a complete data deletion principle can provide. 
A. Consequences of Needless Data Retention: Reduction in Data Subjects' Autonomy 
To respect data subjects' autonomy and human dignity, data subjects must 
have some measure of control over the collection, use, and disclosure of data about 
them. Because important decisions are made about data subjects on the basis of 
the data, lack of control over the data deprives individuals of control over the deci-
sions. "Privacy involves the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having others con-
trol information that can affect whether an individual gets a job, becomes licensed 
to practice in a profession, or obtains a critical loan .... It is not merely the collec-
tion of data that is the problem-it is our complete lack of control over the ways it 
is used or may be used in the future."68 Generally accepted data protection prin-
ciples, like collection limitation and purpose specification, protect individual au-
tonomy by limiting how much information is collected and requiring that the 
purpose be specified, but without a data deletion principle, enforcing other prin-
ciples becomes much more difficult. This is particularly true because principles 
regulating collection and notice are generally procedural and not fully utilized by 
68. SOLOVE,supra note I, at 51. 
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individuals.69 No one could reasonably exercise all procedural data protection 
rights, so substantive protections, like a requirement to destroy unneeded data, 
are essential to provide a baseline of data protection. 
1. "Function Creep" 
Data constitute a flexible resource. Financial records, for example, can be used 
for many reasons, such as targeting advertisements at certain economic classes, as-
sessing taxes, or tracking money-laundering and other criminal activities. It is this 
malleability that makes purpose specification so crucial to data protection. Without 
it, institutions will inevitably be tempted to use data for new purposes, including 
purposes that were not specified when the data were collected. 
The growing ability to aggregate, compare, and cross-check different data sets 
against each other creates many opportunities to use data for purposes other than the 
one for which the data were originally collected. For instance, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) collects data on income for the purposes of assessing taxes.70 The Social 
Security Administration (SSA) collects data on any person who applies for a social 
security number.71 The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilizes an 
Automated Targeting System to collect data on people entering and leaving the coun-
try.72 Agencies conduct data matches between databases and combine them to create 
new databases.73 Much of the value of data sold by private data aggregators, like 
Choicepoint and LexisNexis, derives from the combination of many other private 
and public data sets that, once brought together, can be used for other purposes/4 
Function creep undermines data subjects' autonomy by depriving them, often 
without their knowledge, of any control over their data. Predictably, the availabil-
ity of such data is also very tempting to data controllers. Why collect data all over 
again when you can do something useful with existing data? The history of the 
social security number amply illustrates the extent to which data can be used for 
69. See Cate,supra note 9, 363-64,366-67. 
70. Privacy Act of 1974, as Amended; Systems of Records, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,284, 13,304 (Mar. 12, 
2008). 
71. Altered System of Records and New Routine Use, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,165, 14,166 (Mar. 24, 1998). 
72. Notice of Privacy Act System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543,64,544 (Nov. 2, 2006). 
73. See, e.g., Dalia Naamani-Goldman, Anti-terrorism Program Mines IRS' Records: Privacy Advo-
cates are Concerned that Tax Data and Other Information may be Used Improperly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2007, at I, available at 2007 WLNR 792302. For a review of government data collection and data-
mining, see generally Fred. H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Frameworft 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008). 
74. Scott Canon, Pending Merger would Combine Bi//iom of Data Files, KAN. CITY STAR, May 25, 
2008, at AI. 
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purposes entirely foreign to the original collection/5 Originally created to track 
employees' contributions to Social Security, the social security number is now a de 
facto national identifier, utilized in banks, educational institutions, and many 
other non-Social Security government programs. Deleting unneeded data is the 
surest way to avoid the temptation to deviate from the specified purposes and en-
sure respect for individuals' autonomy. While anonymizing unnecessary data pro-
vides some protection, if the data are not needed for their specified purpose, there 
is no legitimate reason to retain them. There is a risk that useful data will mistak-
enly be destroyed, but there is always a risk of careless records management. Since 
data controllers tend to default to retaining data, the risk of mistaken deletions 
does not outweigh the benefits of secure destruction of unneeded data. 
2. Stale and Inaccurate Records 
As proficient as modern data collection systems are, they are not perfect and 
inaccuracies are inevitable. For instance, a portion of credit bureaus' files contain 
important errors.76 Every year, a number of people who are still living are re-
corded as deceased by the Social Security Administration (SSA), leading to enor-
mous difficulties for both SSA and the data subjects.77 Errors primarily creep into 
data sets in two ways. First, as personal data ages, they are likely to become less 
accurate. People frequently move, change jobs, become sick, and change their 
buying preferences. Second, the more data that are collected, the more likely it is 
that clerical errors will occur. These errors lead to mischaracterizations of indi-
viduals, thereby reducing data subjects' control over their own lives-for example, 
by treating them as persons that, in fact, they are not. Individual participation and 
access helps address this problem, but the burden for keeping records accurate 
and current should not fall solely on the data subject. A data deletion principle 
75. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM SLAVERY TO THE 
WAR OF TERROR 85-89 (2003). 
76. According to one study, 79% of credit files contained errors and 25% of files had errors se-
rious enough to result in wrongful denial of credit. See ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, 
NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS, MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ER-
RORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS, 11-13 (2004), available at http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/ 
BE/ev /BEevuv 19a3 KzsA TRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004 .pdf. 
i7. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SURVIVOR BENEFITS PAID IN INSTANCES 
WHEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REMOVED THE DEATH ENTRY FROM A PRIMARY 
WAGE EARNER's RECORD, Audit Rep. A-06-06-26020 (Sept. 2006) 1-2, available at http://www. 
ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-06-06-26020.pdf; Alex Johnson & Nancy Amons, Government Re-
cords Incorrectly Kill off Thousands, and There's No Easy Fix, MSNBC, Feb. 29, 2008, availabe at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23378093/. 
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helps eliminate stale and inaccurate records by destroying the very records that 
are most likely to be irrelevant, erroneous, or out-of-date. 
B. Consequences of Needless Data Retention: Increased Risk of Harm to Individual 
Data Subjects 
In addition to undermining individuals' dignity and reducing their control 
over important life decisions made about them, retaining unneeded data increases 
the risk of the data being misused to the detriment of the data subjects. As data 
holdings have become more extensive, they are more valuable to criminals who 
are capable of using the data to commit fraud. 
1. Data Theft, Loss, and Fraud 
Personal information has become a valuable commodity for people who seek to 
defraud banks, insurance companies, and other corporations. Another individual's 
data can be used to fraudulently obtain credit, steal money, avoid the consequences of 
a criminal record, cast multiple votes in an election, or illegally gain employment.78 
While relatively old data may not be useful for some illegal purposes (a ten-
year-old credit card number is unlikely to be valid), some, like a social security 
number, can remain very useful. Even the records of deceased individuals can be 
used; sometimes, they are more valuable because there is no living victim to com-
plain about the fraud. The longer a data controller retains data, the more likely 
that data will be lost or misused. If old data are not destroyed, they accumulate, 
increasing the opportunity for loss because there are more data to catalog and se-
cure, and it becomes more difficult to securely transport and store the data. Old 
data, especially data that are not being kept for a specific purpose, are less likely to 
be used regularly, and thus, security measures may be more lax and breaches more 
difficult to promptly detect. When data breaches do occur, they can cause more 
damage because they affect more data subjects whose data, if regular data de-
struction were practiced, would have been deleted. 
In recent years, numerous data breaches have been reported, some of which con-
tained rather old data and some of which involved data controllers disposing of re-
cords in a way that left the data exposed to misappropriation.79 Even if data are merely 
78. See, e.g., Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Identity Crisis: As Society Goes More Hi-tech, so do the Thieves 
of Persona/ Information, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18,2008, at 6,avai/ab/eat 2008 WLNR 15616650. 
79. For extensive examples of data breaches, many of which involve old or improperly destroyed 
data, see The Breach Blog, http://breachblog.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) and Privacy News, 
http://www.pogowasright.org/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
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misplaced or lost, data subjects then have to live with the anxiety of potentially being 
harmed through use of the lost data. Under a data deletion principle, some of that 
unneeded data would be destroyed, and therefore could not be lost or misused. 
2. Harmful Decisions Made on The Basis of Stale and Inaccurate Data 
As discussed above, the longer information is retained, the more difficult it is 
to keep the data relevant and accurate. Since personal information is used to make 
extremely important decisions about individuals, inaccurate information can have 
catastrophic consequences for data subjects. Inaccurate medical records can lead 
to dangerous treatment decisions; incorrect credit records can result in adverse 
loan decisions; and erroneous criminal records can result in unwarranted job ter-
minations. 50 Personal data are useful only to the extent that they are accurate and 
current. Thus, a data deletion principle is important not only for reducing the risk 
of data subjects being harmed by misuse of their data, but also for increasing the 
probability that the data will be suitable for their beneficial purposes. 
Ill. A PROPOSED DATA DELETION PRINCIPLE 
Global data protection principles, once universally accepted, will help harmo-
nize national data protection laws, thereby facilitating efficient, transnational 
transfers of personal data that serve important social and economic functions. 
Unfortunately, data protection principles have thus far given short shrift to data 
deletion as a crucial component of an effective global data protection regime. This 
omission has left a gap in data protection norms, reducing data controllers' respect 
for data subjects' autonomy and exposing data subjects to potential abuse of their 
data. The Data Deletion Principle (hereinafter the Principle) proposed below 
aims to fill that gap, and its inclusion will make a global data protection regime 
more robust by regulating the end of information's life cycle. 
A. Text of the Data Deletion Principle 
DATA DELETION-All personal information, regardless of format, data 
controller, or location, should be securely and verifiably destroyed within: 
80. SoLOVE,supra note I, at 46-47. 
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a. the time specified in a publicly available data destruction schedule that has 
been approved by a legally authorized data protection authority, provided that 
the time period is necessary for the specified purpose of the data and does not 
exceed ten years after creation of the record; or 
b. one year after creation of the record, if the record is not subject to a data de-
struction schedule; unless, 
c. the data protection authority approves a longer retention period, including 
permanent retention. 
The data controller shall have the burden of showing that the longer reten-
tion period is justified by serving the public good or the interests of the data sub-
jects. Data shall be destroyed in accordance with the data destruction schedule 
approved in the nation in which the data are collected. Failure to destroy personal 
information within the applicable period should render the data controller liable 
to any data subjects who are harmed by misuse of information that should have 
been deleted. National data protection authorities should ensure that data de-
struction schedules are consistent across industries and jurisdictions. Additionally, 
the data protection authorities should enforce compliance through appropriate 
legal mechanisms, excluding data controllers with fewer than twenty-five em-
ployees and holding personal data on fewer than five hundred individuals. 
B. Implementation of the Data Deletion Principle 
Compliance with the Principle will impose administrative burdens on data 
controllers, but it is consistent with good record management practices and exist-
ing legal data destruction obligationsY Despite additional cost, securely destroy-
ing unneeded data is simply a part of responsible data management. As such, data 
deletion should be considered as important as other data management practices. 
I. Application of the Data Deletion Principle 
Since personal records are held by both government and private sector data con-
trollers, the Principle must apply equally to both public and private actors. However, 
due to the amount of resources required, very small data controllers, those that em-
81. See ANDREW 8. SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO fED-
ERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW §19:9 (2007); PETER P. SWIRE & SOL 8ERMANN, INFORMA-
TION PRIVACY: OFFICIAL REFERENCE FOR THE CERTIFIED INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONAL 
[CIPP]I73-74 (2007). 
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ploy fewer than twenty-five people and control data on fewer than five hundred indi-
viduals, will not be subject to enforcement actions by national data protection 
authorities. While these small data controllers will not be penalized by data protec-
tion authorities for neglecting to file data destruction schedules or to destroy data, 
they are still liable to individuals who are harmed by abuse of data that are not se-
curely destroyed within the applicable time limits. Imposition of liability provides 
some incentive to comply with the Principle, and may also induce insurance compa-
nies to encourage or require compliance as a condition of issuing liability insurance. 
2. Data Destruction Schedules 
Transparency, accountability, and individual choice are served by requiring 
data controllers to catalog and publicly declare their personal data systems and to set 
definite retention periods before data will be securely destroyed. Data subjects will 
be able to know how long data about them are retained, thus increasing their aware-
ness of the bureaucratic processes that handle the data. Like current privacy policies, 
it is unlikely that data destruction schedules will be read by many data subjects.82 
However, the most basic level of individual access is making information about data 
collection, processing, and disposal publicly available. Public destruction schedules 
will also facilitate oversight by private actors and data protection authorities. 
All data destruction schedules should be filed with, and approved by, autho-
rized data protection authorities. While most nations have government agencies 
that serve this function, some may opt to authorize a private or quasi-governmen-
tal entity to approve data destruction schedules. It is important that the authority 
vigorously review the schedules and ensure consistency across industries. With 
strong enforcement, industry norms that roughly standardize data retention peri-
ods would likely be developed, and the authority would then enforce those norms 
by rejecting outlier schedules. For example, if banks generally retained certain 
transaction data for five years, the authority would require special justification 
before approving a schedule that retains the same data for fifteen years. Just as 
telemarketers pay fees to fund federal and state do-not-call registries, review of 
data destruction schedules could be funded by the data controllers. 
3. Data Retention Periods 
The Principle sets a short retention period for transitory data and thus relieves 
data controllers from having to catalog it. Any data needed for more than a year will 
be cataloged in a schedule. However, data controllers cannot be permitted simply to 
82. Cate, supra note 9, at 360-61. 
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impose whatever time limit they wish. A data destruction schedule that merely de-
clares that all data will be kept indefinitely is not particularly helpful in terms of 
preventing the harms caused by retention of unneeded, stale data. Hence, the data 
protection authority must review the retention periods within the submitted data 
destruction schedules and ensure that they are necessary to achieve the purposes for 
which the data are collected. Admittedly, some data (though probably a relatively 
small portion of all data collected) will have to be kept for a long time, perhaps even 
permanently. Retention periods over ten years must be justified by the data subjects' 
interests or the public interest. Because the retention period is tied to the specified 
purpose of the data collection, the risk of function creep is greatly reduced. Data 
will be destroyed before new, unrelated uses for the data appear. 
4. Secure Destruction 
When the retention period for data ends, it is critical that the data be securely 
and verifiably destroyed. Otherwise, the data will be exposed to misuse. Verification 
of data destruction must be maintained to permit oversight by the data protection 
authority and to protect the data controller from liability to data subjects. Mecha-
nisms for secure data destruction, such as shredders and degassers, already exist to 
comply with the few data destruction mandates that are currently utilized. 
Some personal data can be useful in an anonymized or aggregate form. Such 
data, assuming they could not be used to identify individuals, would no longer be 
personal information and would not be regulated by data protection principles. 
As long as the identifying components of the data are securely deleted, aggregate 
data derived from personal data can be used and retained for any reason. 
5. Consistency Across Industries and Jurisdictions 
A major challenge for the implementation of harmonized national data dele-
tion mandates is maintaining relatively consistent data destruction schedules 
across industries and jurisdictions. Unless a supranational data protection author-
ity is created (a project even more ambitious than establishing universal data pro-
tection principles), there will inevitably be some variation among the data 
protection authorities' handling of data destruction schedules. This is a difficulty 
that is inherent in a system that adopts universal norms while granting discretion 
in implementation to each state, and must be accepted at this point in the develop-
ment of a global data protection regime. 
Variation can be minimized between data controllers in each nation by the 
data protection authorities. Roughly similar retention periods should be required 
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for similar systems of personal information collected for like purposes. Multina-
tional corporations should apply similar retention periods within all their subsid-
iaries, regardless of jurisdiction. This will foster consistency across jurisdictions. 
This proposal assumes a level of cooperation between national data protection 
authorities. A conflict could arise if industry standards in one jurisdiction are too dif-
ferent from legal mandates in another. For instance, search engines in the United 
States have begun to delete identifying data in search logs after eighteen months.83 At 
the same time, some European nations are considering data retention laws that re-
quire storage of internet usage data for a longer period.84 While these two examples 
do not directly conflict, they indicate diverging balances between privacy and data 
retention. Conflicts between these jurisdictions may put data controllers in an unten-
able position of being unable to have approved schedules in both countries. 
This is an unavoidable consequence of divergent approaches to data protec-
tion and can be solved only by negotiation and compromise among the national 
data protection authorities. It is impossible to have a harmonized, global data de-
letion mandate while permitting wide disparities among jurisdictions' retention 
standards. Adoption of a data deletion principle does not end the global dialogue 
on data protection; deliberation must continue to establish more specific global 
retention standards. 
6. Enforcement 
Enforcement of the Principle can be accomplished by national data protec-
tion authorities and the individual data subjects who have been harmed by the 
misuse of their personal information. Data protection authorities can periodically 
audit data controllers' verification records and determine if the data destruction 
schedules are being followed. Fines, regulatory orders, and other administrative 
measures can help ensure compliance. Data protection authorities will likely focus 
their resources on large and systemic violations, while an individual right of ac-
tion for data subjects harmed by misuse of improperly handled data will hold 
controllers responsible for smaller violations that lead to actual harm. Large data 
breaches, like the TJ Maxx breach,85 if involving data that were not destroyed in 
accordance with data deletion laws, would subject the controller to heavy liability 
83. Miguel Helft, Coogle Adds a Safeguard on Privacy for Searchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at 
C4. 
84. Matthew Sparkes, Government Proposes Email and Internet Tracking, PCPRO, Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/218052/government-proposes-internet-tracking.html. 
85. Eric Dash, Data Breach Could Affect Millions ofTJX Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,2007, at C9. 
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to harmed individuals, giving individuals redress and providing a strong incentive 
to controllers to destroy data in accordance with applicable retention periods. 
The enforcement mechanisms directly relate to the purposes of the Principle: 
protecting individual autonomy and avoiding harm. Data protection authorities' 
enforcement activities will encourage data destruction norms, protect individual 
autonomy, and increase public confidence in data collection, processing, and 
global transfer. Furthermore, individual lawsuits will help discourage careless re-
cord disposal and provide redress for harms caused by abuse facilitated by inse-
curely discarded data. 
CoNcLUSION 
With digital capture, processing, transfer, and storage of personal informa-
tion becoming less expensive, it is easy for data controllers to adopt a "packrat" 
attitude toward data retention. Why dispose of information when it is cheap to 
keep and you never know when it might come in handy? However, this attitude 
undermines generally accepted data protection norms and deprives data subjects 
of knowledge and control over important decisions made on the basis of their 
data. It also increases the chances that the data will be used in ways that deviate 
from the data's original purpose and that it will be stolen, lost, or misused to harm 
both data subjects and controllers. 
The tendency to accumulate and keep personal information indefinitely must 
be resisted if global data protection principles are to be as effective as possible. A 
data deletion principle is needed that encourages public disclosure of data reten-
tion periods, that is related to the data's purposes, and that is generally consistent 
across borders between nations and industries. Unneeded data should be securely 
and verifiably destroyed; failure to do so should subject most controllers to admin-
istrative penalties and liability to harmed individuals. 
Global transfers of personal data are important and should be encouraged. 
Data protection standards that regulate the entire data life cycle, from collection 
to deletion, will increase data subjects' confidence in data controllers and lower 
legal barriers to moving data across national borders. Collection of personal data 
is a global phenomenon, and a global data protection regime that includes data 
deletion requirements is best suited to harness i:he advantages of global data while 
minimizing the risks of harm. 
